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Abstract:   We propose a “dynamic escape route system” for emergency evacuation of a naval 
ship. The system employs signals that adapt to the causative contingency and the crew’s physical 
distribution about the ship. A mixed-integer nonlinear programming model, with underlying 
network structure, optimizes the evacuation process. The network’s nodes represent 
compartments, closures (e.g., doors, hatches) and intersections, while arcs represent various types 
of passageways. The objective function integrates two potentially conflicting factors: average 
evacuation time, and the watertight and airtight integrity of the ship after evacuation. A heuristic 
solves the model approximately using a sequence of mixed-integer linear approximating problems. 
Using data for a Spanish frigate, with standard “static routes” specified by the ship’s designers, 
computational tests show that the dynamic system can reduce average evacuation times nearly 
23%, and can improve a combined measure of ship integrity by up to 50%.  In addition, plausible 
design changes to the frigate yield further, substantial improvements.  
 
Keywords:   evacuation time; ship integrity; multi-commodity flow; nonlinear network model 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The abandonment of a naval ship is an improbable event, but if it does occur, the ship is 
likely to be sinking or on fire.  Because of this danger, the crew should evacuate the ship’s 
interior as quickly as possible. While evacuating, however, the crew should attempt to maintain 
the ship’s watertight and airtight integrity by leaving open as few doors, hatches and other 
closures as possible. This paper shows how a system of configurable signals could direct 
crewmembers to escape routes that would reduce average evacuation time and improve the post-
evacuation watertight and airtight integrity of the ship, compared to currently used static escape 
routes. 
Static escape routes are those routes implied by signs painted or mounted on a ship’s 
passageways (e.g., corridors, stairways) to guide evacuees to mustering stations (i.e., gathering 
points), prior to leaving the ship; this system of routes is “information non-adaptive”. A dynamic 
escape route system (DERS) would also guide evacuees to mustering stations, but would 
incorporate electronic or electro-mechanical signals that could be configured to account for 
specific damage conditions, e.g., blocked passageways, and for the crew’s physical distribution 
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about the ship; such a system is “information adaptive.” By coupling extra information with 
appropriate signaling, the dynamic system has a clear potential for reducing evacuation times and 
thereby improving the crew’s safety, compared to the static routes. 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) establishes security procedures for merchant 
and passenger ships to comply with mandatory Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations [14]. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has recently developed analogous regulations as 
part of its Naval Ship Code (NATO Naval Armaments Group [18]; see Chapter VII). Although 
these regulations are not mandatory for NATO’s member nations, at least one member, the 
United Kingdom, has adopted them [15].  Excerpts from the Code state: 
Naval vessels shall be adequately designed, constructed, equipped, maintained and 
provided with procedures for the Escape, Evacuation and Rescue of all embarked persons 
following all foreseeable emergency situations and damage conditions  ([18], p. 85). 
Escape and Evacuation Analysis and Escape and Evacuation Demonstration shall ensure 
that effectiveness of escape and evacuation measures are optimised ([18], p. 88). 
Clearly, the static escape route system that naval ships currently use cannot be reconciled 
with these regulations.  
We do not assume that DERS would optimize escape routes at the time of the contingency 
(although future research may show this to be possible). Rather, we expect that alternative route 
configurations would be established in advance. Then, given (a) a specific contingency, (b) the 
ship’s damage condition or expected damage condition, and (c) the crew’s physical distribution 
about the ship, the ship’s damage-control officer would select the evacuation plan that best fits 
the situation.  Alternatively, an automated system could make this selection with the damage-
control officer’s oversight. The signals would probably consist of illuminated (possibly electro-
mechanical) arrow signs indicating directions of travel, and would be activated according to the 
pre-stored configuration that best suits the contingency. 
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We note that several dynamic escape-route systems are already commercially available for 
fire-protection in structures such as hospitals, airports and office buildings. For instance, the 
Dynamic Escape Routing System (INOTEC Sicherheitstechnik GmbH [12]) uses visual signals, 
while EVACom (Schneider Intercom [24]) uses auditory signals. To our knowledge, these 
systems respond to information from sensors such as smoke detectors, but do not account for the 
physical distribution of a structure’s occupants. However, researchers who study the evacuation 
of these structures certainly realize that better escape routes could be developed by taking this 
distribution into account (Pu and Zlatanova [21]). 
DERS is especially appropriate for a naval ship, because (a) the crew of such a ship is a well-
trained and exceedingly familiar with its ship, and therefore should have no difficulties following 
special signals, (b) unlike passengers on a passenger vessel, the location of crewmembers on a 
naval ship is known quite accurately in most situations, and (c) the ship’s physical condition, i.e., 
“damage condition,” resulting from an accident or hostile action, should be better defined than on 
a commercial vessel, because a naval ship is built with extensive damage control in mind. 
The DERS we propose will signal an escape route based on the solution of a mathematical-
programming model that minimizes a weighted function of average evacuation time and a “ship-
integrity index,” for a given damage condition and crew distribution. (For simplicity, we use 
“integrity” hereafter to mean “watertight and airtight integrity.”) The ship’s post-evacuation 
integrity is important because (a) the longer a damaged ship stays afloat, the better chance its 
crew has to be rescued, and (b) if a ship maintains its integrity, it may not sink at all and can be 
salvaged and returned to service, at a cost well below that of a constructing new ship. 
A weighted-sum objective function has the benefit that its optimal solutions are “efficient” 
(i.e., “nondominated,” or “Pareto-optimal”) for its objectives (e.g., Ehrgott [6], pp. 24, 68). 
Solving the model for different weights does not guarantee the generation of all efficient 
solutions; the goal-programming technique of constraining one objective and optimizing the other 
can help find additional efficient solutions (e.g., Ehrgott [6], pp. 98-110). But, our computational 
DRAFT, 1 July 2008 
 4
experience shows that the weighted-sum approach produces efficient solutions that leave only 
modest gaps in the trade-off curve (“efficient frontier”) for the two objective functions. Thus, 
when it comes time to establish an appropriate tradeoff, the decision-maker can choose from a 
wide range of options which we, as analysts, will have provided.  
A potential objection to the weighted-sum approach is that it mixes goals measured in 
different units (e.g., Rosenthal [23]). In our case, we mix units of ship integrity with units of time.  
The former units may be viewed as having a partly economic value—try to keep the ship afloat so 
it can be salvaged—while the latter correlates primarily with saving human lives. However, 
military planners make such tradeoffs all the time, at least implicitly, and our approach can 
provide such planners with a wide range of solutions from which to choose an appropriate 
tradeoff. If computational results on another ship type should exhibit large jumps in one objective 
as weights change only modestly, then a goal-programming approach could be considered. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ship-evacuation 
process and reviews relevant literature. Section 3 explains our modeling assumptions and presents 
the mathematical formulation of the problem. This section also describes the heuristic algorithm 
we use to solve the problem approximately. Section 4 presents computational results for the 
DERS model applied to a Spanish frigate, under several contingency scenarios. Section 5 
summarizes the paper and provides conclusions. 
2. SHIP EVACUATION AND EVACUATION MODELS 
2.1 Situational Awareness and Damage Information 
The command structure of a naval ship will normally have a good understanding of the ship’s 
status, including where its personnel are located and the physical condition of the ship. Three 
concepts are key to understanding this: 
• The watch condition of readiness, or simply “watch condition,” ordered by the 
commanding officer (CO), determines which stations are manned and to what extent, 
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based on the organizational bill (“watch, quarter and station bill”) of the ship. That is, the 
watch condition defines, to a greater or lesser degree, the physical distribution of the crew 
about the ship. Representative instances are “General Quarters,” which applies during 
combat and under emergencies, and “Peace-time Cruising.” Under General Quarters, 
with few exceptions, the location of every crewmember will be known precisely, because 
they will be at their pre-assigned battle stations.  During Peace-time Cruising, only the 
location of crewmembers standing watch will be known precisely, but good estimates 
should available for the number of crew in sleeping areas and in the mess.   
• The  material condition of readiness, or simply “material condition,” also ordered by the 
CO, defines the degree of access to various areas of the ship. All closures are marked 
with a letter, which determines whether the closure is open or closed for the ordered 
material condition (United States Government Printing Office [27]). For instance, 
material condition ZEBRA applies during combat operations and provides the greatest 
degree of integrity but the least accessibility across the ship: closures marked “X,” “Y,” 
and “Z” are all closed in this case. On the other hand, material condition XRAY applies 
when the ship is in no apparent danger: only closures marked with “X” are closed.  
YOKE is an intermediate condition, used in wartime but non-combat situations, and 
requires “X” and “Y” closures to be closed. In effect then, material condition determines 
a ship’s pre-contingency level of integrity. 
• Should a ship receive any damage, her damage-control officer orders repair parties to 
assess and report on damage, and to try to extinguish fires or block flooding.  The goal is 
to maintain the ship’s fighting capability and to enable an eventual return to port.  Except 
in the case of certain catastrophic damage, the damage-control officer, and thus the CO, 
should have an accurate estimate of the damage to the ship, including (a) which passages 
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are blocked or partially blocked by damage or by repair-party work, and (b) the condition 
of mustering stations.  
Analyzing the sequence of events that may lead to ship abandonment, while taking the three 
concepts above into account, we identify two general cases in which pre-programmed evacuation 
plans would apply:     
• Case 1, delayed abandonment. If struck by a missile or mine, or if some other 
contingency arises, the ship will probably not be abandoned immediately. The crew 
would first be ordered to General Quarters (Hays [11]). Then, the damage-control officer 
repair parties and other crew would assesses the damage, and begin damage control, if 
possible. At this stage, dynamic escape routes could be based on (a) the location and 
extent of the damage reported by the repair parties and compiled by the damage-control 
officer, (b) an accurate knowledge of the crew’s physical distribution, known insofar as 
most crewmembers would be at their general-quarters stations (exceptions would depend 
on the location of damage-control parties, casualties, and the fact that some stations may 
be inaccessible because of damage or fire), and (c) the known status of most closures.  
(General Quarters implies material condition ZEBRA, although damage and damage-
control efforts might modify the status of some closures.)  In this situation, escape routes 
would direct crewmembers from their known locations, along undamaged passageways 
to undamaged mustering stations, and could limit evacuation along routes needed by 
repair parties. 
•  Case 2, immediate abandonment. A ship can be damaged so severely by torpedoes, 
missiles or other weapons that its loss becomes apparent within a few minutes, or even 
seconds, of incurring the damage. In this situation, DERS would incorporate the best data 
possible for the applicable watch and material conditions. DERS might also be able to 
incorporate some information about actual damage (for example, from visual observation 
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from the bridge) or anticipated damage (for example, a ship that is threatened by mines 
can at least anticipate that any damage will occur below the waterline.)  
Case 1 would apply in the majority of instances in which a ship must eventually be 
abandoned, and we see that this “standard case” would also present the most accurate data for 
selecting a near-optimal DERS evacuation plan. 
Case 2 would be the “fallback case,” which would be used if the ship receives an impact with 
little or no warning. For instance, during the Falklands War of 1982, the Argentine cruiser ARA 
General Belgrano sank only minutes after being struck by torpedoes from a British submarine 
(Woodward  [28], pp. 149-163). The General Belgrano detected neither the submarine nor its 
torpedoes before the first torpedo exploded. Even in this case, however, DERS would be 
exploiting partial information, specifically, (a) a complete or partial picture of crew distribution, 
depending on the watch condition, and (b) the state of each closure not affected by the impact, 
depending on the material condition. For instance, the General Belgrano was in watch condition 
Wartime Cruising when it was struck (Armada Argentina [1]), and thus, its crew’s physical 
distribution should have been known in some detail. 
DERS will likely yield better escape routes than a static system, even with incomplete 
information as in Case 2. With the addition of sensors that identify impassable or damaged 
passageways, and that determine the exact number of crewmembers in each compartment, the 
system could respond equally well in all situations.  
2.2 Models for Ship Evacuation 
The evacuation process for occupants of any structure, e.g., building, aircraft, passenger ship, 
offshore platform, and even for inhabitants of a geographical region, has been modeled in the 
literature using two basic approaches: 
1. An optimization model searches for optimal routes for evacuees, who are typically treated 
as a single, homogeneous commodity in which individual behavior can be ignored. These 
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models are typically linear or nonlinear programs that may be viewed as network-flow 
models with side constraints (e.g., Chalmet et al. [2], Chiu et al. [3]  and Choi et al. [4]). 
2. A discrete-event simulation takes individual movement and uncertain behavior into 
account, trying to represent realistically the decisions made during the evacuation process 
(e.g., Fire Safety Engineering Group [7], Taaffe et al. [26]). 
We choose optimization because the trained crew of a naval ship can be expected to 
move where directed, i.e., as controlled “flows” of individuals, and because optimization is better 
at providing the prescriptive, escape-route solutions we desire. However, our optimization model, 
even in a simplified, linearized form, is substantially more complicated than the models in [2]-[4]. 
In particular, evacuees are not homogeneous because crewmembers in a given compartment at the 
time of evacuation must follow a single evacuation route as a group.  This means that our model 
requires multi-commodity-flow constructs, not just single-commodity constructs.  Furthermore, 
the modeling of groups requires the use of binary flow variables which, along with a knapsack 
capacity constraint for each mustering station, imply that the linearized model is no easier to 
solve than the “multiple knapsack problem.”  The multiple knapsack problem is NP-hard (Karp 
[16]), and thus it appears that our model is, in fact, a difficult-to-solve, nonlinear, integer-
programming model. 
The next section develops an optimization model of the ship-evacuation process that (a) 
accounts for the ship’s watertight and airtight integrity, (b) adapts data regarding the movement 
speeds of evacuees to a homogeneous population, (c) explicitly incorporates the effects of 
impediments such as sealed closures, blocked passageways and counter-movements (“counter-
flows”) of repair parties, and (d) identifies an evacuation route for each group of crewmembers.  
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3. MATHEMATICAL MODEL AND ALGORITHM 
3.1 Overview and Preliminaries 
We represent a ship’s “enclosure” by a directed network ( , )H N A= , derived from technical 
and construction drawings: this is the “DERS network.” Nodes N  represent compartments, 
closures and intersections of passageways, and arcs A  represent passageways along with 
directions of travel that evacuees could conceivably use. Source nodes represent compartments 
where crewmembers are located when “Abandon Ship!” is ordered, and “muster nodes” represent 
mustering stations from where the crewmembers will abandon the ship. 
The occupants of each compartment, i.e., a group, define a unit of supply of a single 
commodity, in a multi-commodity flow model defined on .H  Each muster node connects, via an 
artificial arc, to a super-sink with one unit of demand for each commodity. This represents the 
reasonable assumption that all crewmembers in a group will follow the same route and reach the 
same mustering station (although the model will choose which mustering station). Joint  capacity 
constraints on these mustering-station arcs—each commodity applies a conversion factor from 
“group” to “number of crewmembers in the group”—represent upper and lower bounds on the 
number of crewmembers that should gather there. Upper bounds reflect the limited capacity of 
lifeboats located at the mustering stations, and possibly the limited number of lifejackets there; 
lower bounds reflect the minimum number of crewmembers needed to manage lifeboats properly. 
(In high conditions of readiness, each crewmember may preemptively don an inflatable lifejacket. 
In this case, the supply of lifejackets at each mustering station would become irrelevant, although 
the capacity of lifeboats would continue to constrain any evacuation.) 
The model seeks to minimize an objective function that incorporates two goals represented 
by an evacuation index T and a ship-integrity index I. The index T reflects the average evacuation 
time for all crewmembers, while the index I reflects the number of closures that are opened to aid 
evacuation. These two goals conflict with each other to some extent: opening (“unsealing”) a 
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watertight or airtight door may speed evacuation, but it may also degrade the ship’s integrity.   
Once opened, the closure may not be closed (“resealed”) for reasons discussed below, and an 
open closure reduces integrity because it increases the volume of the ship that is subject to 
flooding or fire damage.  
The model is a nonlinear, mixed-integer program with an underlying network structure. The 
model is difficult to solve exactly for two key reasons: 
• The speed g i js  at which evacuee group g  traverses arc ( , )i j  depends on the total 
number of evacuees traversing the arc at roughly the same time. We adopt the speed 
function recommended by the IMO for passenger ships, but without age or gender 
corrections (International Maritime Organization [13]; see also Figure 1). This function 
depends on 
o type of arc, e.g., corridor, companionway, trunk (a “companionway” is a 
staircase between decks, and a “trunk” is a vertical passageway fitted with a 
ladder, sometimes specifically intended to aid escape), 
o the direction (horizontal, up, or down),  and  
o the concurrent flow of evacuees traversing an arc (the number of people 
moving past a given point per unit time per unit of unimpeded passage width). 
Because flow speed depends on flow quantity, the continuous relaxation of the model is 
nonlinear and non-convex. We note that many other approaches exist to represent speed 
and congestion effects, especially in the vehicle-traffic literature; see Hall [10] who 
provides an overview of standard models.  More recently, several researchers (e.g., Nishi 
and Takahashi [19] for a vehicle-traffic model, Zhang et al. [29] for a work-flow model) 
have suggested the use of staircase functions. These might prove computationally useful 
given our approach of mixed-integer programming, but we have not pursued that topic.   
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• Opening a watertight hatch or other closure on a naval ship is not as simple as opening a 
door in a building, and can take many seconds. Thus, the first group to reach a sealed 
closure at node i  incurs a delay it , corresponding to time required to open the closure. 
Subsequent groups do not incur that delay directly, because we assume that the closure 
remains open. (Standard naval doctrine actually decrees that sailors who pass through a 
closure should reseal that closure after themselves. However, in an emergency situation, 
this doctrine may not be followed consistently, or damage or flooding may make 
resealing impossible. We must make some assumption, and we choose this one because it 
is conservative with respect to ship integrity.) To model such delays explicitly requires 
constructs much like those suggested to model certain job-shop scheduling problems; 
unfortunately, these models are notoriously difficult to solve (Shi and Pan [25]). 
3.2 Optimization Model, DER-NL 
The following mixed-integer nonlinear program defines our Dynamic Escape-Route model 
(DER-NL) for identifying optimal evacuation routes under given watch and material conditions. 
We will solve it approximately using the heuristic algorithm described subsequently. 
Indices 
,i j N∈  nodes, including an artificial super-sink denoted i+ 
g G∈    groups, which consist of crewmembers originally located at the same node 
 (compartment) 
0
gi  origin node for group g,  
0
gi N∈  
MN N⊂   nodes representing mustering stations 
DN N⊂    nodes that require opening a closure for the first group that traverses the node 
(depends on the material condition of the ship) 
( , )i j A∈   directed arcs in ( , )H N A= ; A  includes artificial arcs ( , )a i i+=  for  Mi N∈  
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C set of indices for counter-flow constraints, defined as: 
 {( , , , ) | , ; ; ; ( , ),( , ) }C g g i j g g G g g i j i j j i A′ ′ ′= ∈ ≠ < ∈  
(Note: The heuristic procedure only builds a small subset of C “on the fly,” 




ic  capacity of muster node 
Mi N∈  [number of evacuees] 
gv  size of group g  for the given watch condition [number of evacuees] 
i jd  length of arc ( , )i j  [meters]  (Note: When i is an origin node, i jd  includes a correction 
factor based on the average difficulty for a crewmember in the compartment represented 
by the node i  to reach the appropriate exit. Also, note that 0 M
ii
d i N+ ≡ ∀ ∈ .) 
( )i jS F  speed on arc ( , )i j  as a function of the total concurrent flow F  on the arc 
[meters/second]  (See Figure 1.) 
iω  1 if closure i  is open in the current material condition, and 0 otherwise 
iˆt  time required to open the closure at node 
Di N∈  [seconds] (this is 0 if closure i  is open 
in the specified material condition) 
α  objective-function weight for the trade-off between evacuation time and ship integrity  
t  reference value used in the objective function for normalizing the evacuation-time index 
[seconds]  (We use t = 180 seconds based on the standard duration of the emergency 
breathing devices.) 
Derived Data 
iγ  non-negative weight for closure at node Di N∈ , which reflects the closure’s contribution 
to the ship’s watertight or airtight integrity. For simplicity, we classify each closure as 
contributing to watertight integrity exclusively, or to airtight integrity exclusively, or to 
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neither. Then, iγ  is computed as water water/i nβρ  for watertight closures i , and as 
air air(1 ) /i nβ ρ−  for airtight closures, where 
o wateriρ  is the fractional amount that closure i contributes to the ship’s 
watertight integrity  ( wateriρ = 1.0, 0.8 and 0.2 for watertight doors, hatches 
and scuttles, respectively), 
o airiρ  is defined similarly for airtight integrity (with additional data, wateriρ  
and airiρ  could reflect more detail, such as the volume of the compartment or 
passageway that a closure affects), 
o nwater and nair are the total number of watertight and airtight closures, 
respectively, for the given material condition, and 
o β  reflects the relative importance of watertight versus airtight integrity. 
( 0.75β =  for all tests.  This is somewhat arbitrary, but reflects the naval 
emphasis on watertight integrity, which assures that a ship stays afloat.)  
 
Decision variables [units] 
 
g i jf  1 if group g traverses arc ( , )i j , and 0 otherwise 
g i js  speed of group g while traversing arc ( , )i j  [meters/second]  (Note: 
, M
g i i
s g G i Nμ+ ≡ ∀ ∈ ∈  for some large constant 0μ > . ) 
g i jt   time when group g starts traversing arc ( , )i j , if it does, and 0 otherwise [seconds] 
g iy  1 if group g is the first group crossing a closed closure 
Di N∈ , and 0 otherwise  
T  evacuation-time index (used for notational clarity) 
I ship-integrity index (used for notational clarity) 
*z  optimal objective-function value (used for notational clarity) 
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f, s, t, y  vector forms of g i jf , g i js , g i jt  and g iy , respectively. 
 
Formulation (DER-NL)  
(0)  *z = min (1 )T Iα α+ − , 
 where 
1




g g g i j i g i
g i j A g gi Ng i j
j i
d






⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟≡ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠











|( , ) |( , ) 0
  1, if  
1, if  ,
0, if  \ ,
g
g i j g j i
j i j A j j i A
g
i i
f f i i g G
i N i i
+
∈ ∈ +
⎧ =⎪⎪− = − = ∀ ∈⎨⎪ ∈⎪⎩
∑ ∑  
(2)  , Mg ig i i
g G
v f c i N+
∈
≤ ∀ ∈∑  
(3)  1, ( , , , )g i j g j if f g g i j C′ ′+ ≤ ∀ ∈  
(4)  { } { }0,1 , ; 0,1 , ,g i g i jy g i f g i j∈ ∀ ∈ ∀  
(5)  ( ), , , X∈f s t y , 
 and where X  implicitly defines the following relationships among f, s, t, and y: 
(5.a) For each Di N∈ and g G∈  
{ }1 if argmin | 1, ( , )
0 otherwise.
g i j g i j
g G
g i
g t f i j A
y
′ ′′∈
⎧ = = ∈⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
 
(5.b) Let ( ),k ki j , k = 1,2,…Kg, be the ordered sequence of consecutive arcs traversed 
by group g G∈ . Then:     
1 1
1 1
0, if  1
, if  , 2,...,





k k k k
k k
i j D
g i j k g
g i jg i j
i j D




t i N k K
st
d




=⎧⎪⎪ + ∉ =⎪= ⎨⎪⎪ + + ∈ =⎪⎩
 
(5.c)  For each ( ),  and i j A g G∈ ∈  such that 1g i jf = , let 
{ }|  groups  and  traverse ( , ) concurrentlyg i jG g G g g i j′ ′= ∈ . 
To determine g i jG , we first compare times g i jt  and g j pt  at which a given group 
g  should enter and leave an arc ( , )i j  given current speed estimates, where p is 
the next node after j in group g’s path. Groups g and g′ are then deemed to 
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traverse ( , )i j  concurrently if both groups enter or exit the arc nearly 
simultaneously, or one group appears to overtake and pass the other: 
( )'g i j g i jt t ε− ≤ ∨ ( )'g j p g j pt t ε− ≤ ∨ ( )g i j g i j g j p g j pt t t t′ ′≤ ∧ ≥  
∨ ( )g i j g i j g j p g j pt t t t′ ′≤ ∧ ≥ , where ε  equals 5 seconds in all tests. 
Let 
g i j




= ∑  be the total flow (number of evacuees) concurrent with 
group g to traverse arc ( ),i j . Then, ( )g i j i j g i js S F′ = g i jg G′∀ ∈ .  (See Figure 1.)  
Description of DER-NL 
DER-NL seeks to minimize the objective function (0) based on evacuation-time index T and 
ship-integrity index I. Index T represents the average evacuation time for all groups, normalized 
by the reference time t , while index I represents a weighted and normalized count of the number 
of closures that are opened by the evacuees.  
Constraints (1) represent flow-balance constraints for all groups and nodes. These constraints 
ensure that all the evacuees leave their respective origin nodes (sources) and reach some 
mustering station, if this is feasible. 
Constraints (2) limit the total number of evacuees allowed to assemble at each mustering 
station, based on the availability and capacity of the lifeboats and lifejackets at each station.  
Constraints (3) prohibit counter-flows, i.e., two groups moving in opposite directions on any 
arc. Counter-flows are unacceptable because escape signs should only point in one direction:  
once configured, escape signs must remain fixed during the evacuation process, and cannot vary 
based on which group is traversing the arc. These constraints do not prevent two groups that 
arrive at a node from departing in different directions, however. Allowing such movement may be 
reasonable for groups that arrive from different directions, since they would see different signs; 
but this reflects a model limitation, otherwise. (None of the routes we identify in computational 
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tests exhibits such problematic movements, but if needed, constraints and binary variables could 
be added to the model to force a unique forward direction of travel at each node.) 
Constraints (4) ensure that arc flows and closure openings are binary decisions. 
Equation (5.a) determines whether or not a group is the first group to traverse a node with a 
sealed closure. Equation (5.b) calculates the time at which a given group starts traversing a given 
arc. Equation (5.c) calculates the speed at which a given group traverses an arc, based on the 
approximate number of evacuees that share that arc during each time interval. 
Part of the requirements enforced by equations (5) could be avoided by using a “time-phased 
network” as proposed by Ford and Fulkerson [9]. This network would notably increase our 
model’s size, yet it would not completely eliminate the nonlinearity associated with concurrent 
flows on arcs. The next section proposes a heuristic algorithm to deal with this and related issues. 
3.3 Heuristic Algorithm for Solving DER-NL 
 
We solve DER-NL approximately using an iterative heuristic algorithm that incorporates 
ideas similar to successive linear programming (e.g., Fletcher and Sainz [8]). In each iteration A , 
a mixed-integer linear program (MIP), DER-LA , approximates DER-NL. DER-LA  replaces non-
linear terms in DER-NL, such as 1/ g i js , by fixed values derived by post-processing the solution 
to the previous approximating model, 1DER-L −A . (Of course, values for the first approximating 
model, 0DER-L , are also specified in the heuristic.) For efficiency, DER-LA  only includes those 
counter-flow constraints required to avoid inconsistencies in previous solutions. The iterative 
process repeats until the approximating model requires no additional adjustments. Unlike 
standard sequential linear programming, we do not add penalty terms nor do we enforce trust 
regions: experience indicates that the process converges to a feasible solution in a few iterations 
without such embellishments. We define the procedure formally below.  Note that the heuristic 
yields objective value zˆ , rather than *z .  
DRAFT, 1 July 2008 
 17
 
DER Heuristic Algorithm (DER-HA) 
Step 0 (Initialization): Set 
ˆ : 0, , Dg iy g G i N= ∀ ∈ ∈ ; ( ) ( )ˆ : , , ,g i j i j gs S v g G i j A= ∀ ∈ ∈ ; :C =∅ ; : 0=A ;  
 
Step 1 (Optimization): Solve the current approximating model: 










where (3) is only applied to elements in C , and (6)-(8) are defined as follows: 
(6) ( )ˆ , , ,g i j g i js s g G i j A= ∀ ∈ ∈  (implemented via substitution), 
(7) 
|( , )
, , Dg i g i j
g G j i j A
y f g G i N′
′∈ ∈
≥ ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑  
(8) 
|( , )
ˆ, , | 1Dg i g i j g i
j i j A
y f g G i N y
∈
≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ =∑ . 
Assume DER-LA yields solution vector ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , , )zf s y . 
If  0=A , then let  ˆ:z z= ; 
Step 2 (Post-processing):  
2.a: For all ( ),i j A∈  and g G∈ , estimate all gˆ i jt  using (5.b) and update ˆg i js and 
ˆg ly with values consistent with (5.a)-(5.c). (See details below.) 
 
2.b: Update counter-flow set for the next iteration: 
   ( ){ }ˆ ˆ: , , , | 1g i j g j iC C g g i j f f ′′= ∪ ⋅ = ;  
Step 3 (Convergence): 
If no update to  any ˆg i js or  ,ˆg iy , or to C , was made in Step 2, then 
      Print (“The heuristic solution is”, ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , ,f s t y ).  
      Print (“Corresponding objective value is”, zˆ , “and lower bound is”, z ). 
 STOP. 
Else, set : 1= +A A  and return to Step 1. 
 
Constraints (6) fix all speeds in DER-LA  to those estimated from the previous iteration, 
except for the first iteration, i.e., when 0=A . Constraints (7) force some group that passes 
through a nominally sealed closure to be charged with the time penalty for opening it. After the 
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first iteration, constraints (8) require the first group to reach a closure in the previous iteration to 
be charged with the penalty if that group persists in using the closure in the incumbent iteration. 
For the first iteration, the speed of any group g traversing arc ( , )i j  is set to the maximum 
possible, ( )i j i j gs S v= . This assumes no other group traverses that arc concurrently with group g. 
Constraints (8) do not apply in this first iteration, and constraints (7) clearly imply a relaxation of 
the “real constraint” that the first group reaching a sealed closure be charged with the time 
penalty for opening it.  Given the ideal traversal speeds and the relaxed constraints, the optimal 
objective value from iteration 0=A  provides a lower bound on *z . 
Iterations continue until (a) no significant variation exists between the values of sˆ  and yˆ  
produced by DER-LA  and their corresponding post-processed values, and (b) no counter-flows 
are observed. “No significant variation” in condition (a) means that the algorithm has identified a 
stable set of routes and travel speeds, and that the group charged with opening any closure is, in 
fact, the first group to arrive at that closure.    
The data updates in the post-processing step must be described in more detail to understand 
how the algorithm functions. Using the evacuation routes identified in the solution to DER-LA , 
we must estimate the time at which each group traverses the nodes and arcs in its individual 
evacuation route to provide values for the next iteration. We estimate these times through a 
iterative sequence of group-speed computations that are based concurrent-flow estimates, while 
also accounting for the times required to open sealed closures. Specifically, at the end of Step 1, 
the algorithm will have returned have returned ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , , )zf s y  as the solution to DER-LA , and the post-
processing step, Step 2.a,  estimates gˆ i jt  and updates ˆg i js  and ˆg ly  for iteration 1+A  as follows: 
Details for Step 2.a in DER-HA 
2.a.1:  For each group g, start at origin node 0gi , and use the incumbent evacuee flow fˆ  to 
find the ordered sequence  of arcs ( , )k ki j , k = 1,2,…Kg, traversed by group g. 
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2.a.2:  Let ˆ:=s s  and ˆ:=y y . 
 
2.a.3:  For each group g, and for k = 1,2,…Kg, compute the arc-traversal time k kg i jt  using 
equation (5.b). 
 
2.a.4: For each Di N∈  and g G∈ , use the new values for g i jt  to update y  as indicated in 
equation (5.a). 
 
2.a.5: For each arc ( , )i j  traversed by group g, compute concurrent flow g i jF  and update 
s , all as in equation (5.c). 
 
2.a.6: If any update to y  or s  has taken place in Step (2.a.4) or (2.a.5), return to Step 
(2.a.3). 
 
2.a.6: Let ˆ :=s s  and ˆ :=y y , and use sˆ , yˆ  and fˆ   to update zˆ  as indicated in the objective 
function (0). 
 
2.a.7: Continue with Step 2.b in DER-HA (to update counter-flows). 
 
In computational tests, we find Steps 2.a.3 through 2.a.6 terminate after at most five 
iterations, and thus Step 2.a contributes only negligibly to the overall run time of DER-HA.  
4. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
This section applies DER-NL, and the heuristic solution algorithm DER-HA, to a number of 
evacuation scenarios for a 5,800 tonne Spanish frigate, the F-101 Álvaro de Bazán. We have 
implemented DER-HA using the XPress-MP 2006 optimization suite [5] (optimizer version 
17.01.02), on a Dell Latitude D410 computer running at 2 GHz with 2 Gb of RAM. 
The longest run for any scenario takes no more than one hour and 20 major iterations. The 
average model solves in under 10 minutes and in about six iterations of DER-HA. At least 95% of 
computational time is spent solving the MIPs in Step 1 of the algorithm. Because of these run 
times, DERS would clearly need to be implemented with pre-programmed evacuation plans. 
The relative optimality gap, ˆ100% ( ) /z z z× − , ranges from 0.1% to 2.4% for the “standard 
scenarios,” where we use 0.75.α =  Thus, we can claim near-optimality of the heuristic solutions 
for these standard scenarios. The gap may increase, however, for small values of α  that 
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emphasize ship integrity and which therefore lead to substantial congestions along certain escape 
routes and correspondingly weak lower bounds.. For example, when 0.01α = , some 
combinations of material and watch conditions lead to provable optimality gaps of nearly 20%. 
Overall, we note that DERS does achieve some of its improvements by reducing congestion. 
To demonstrate this, let us define a “(directed) traversal” as one group traversing a particular arc 
in its evacuation route, and define a traversal as “congested” if the traversal is made at less than 
maximum speed.  We find that (a) DERS reduces the total number of congested traversals over 
the static solution from 1,295 to 913 in the Wartime-Cruising (intact-ship) scenario described in 
Section 4.5, and (b) DERS reduces the number of congested traversals from 425 to 334 in the 
General-Quarters (USS Stark) scenario described in Section 4.6. DERS also reduces the total 
number of traversals, congested or not. 
The following subsections describe the study scenarios, and compare detailed results for 
DERS and static routes in those scenarios. 
4.1 Case Study Details 
The Álvaro de Bazán (Figure 2) is the first of four medium-sized multi-purpose frigates 
ordered by the Spanish Navy. The Navantia (formerly Izar) shipyard built the frigate, which was 
commissioned in 2002; see Pérez-Villalonga [20] for additional background.  
The DERS network for the Álvaro de Bazán comprises 639 nodes and 1,435 arcs. Nodes 
represent compartments, closures, intersections and mustering stations, distributed on seven 
decks, with three decks above the main deck and three below. Arcs represent companionways, 
corridors, trunks and other passageways. 
The distribution of the ship’s 245 crewmembers across compartments depends on the watch 
condition ordered by the CO. Table 1 shows significant differences in crew distribution by deck 
for some representative conditions. For example, the In-port watch condition has most of the crew 
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resting in cabins and berthing. In this case, the ship’s material condition is typically “XRAY,” 
and ship integrity is most relaxed, i.e., many closures are open. 
4.2 Scenario Overview 
We demonstrate the benefits of DERS using a number of scenarios, each defined by watch, 
material, and damage conditions. Three standard combinations of watch and material conditions 
are considered: General Quarters with ZEBRA (GQ-Z), Wartime Cruising with YOKE (WC-Y), 
and In-port with XRAY (IP-X). Each of these combinations differ in both crew distribution 
(defined by the watch condition) and which closures are initially open (defined by the material 
condition), so we assess add two hypothetical combinations for initial testing: General Quarters 
with YOKE (GQ-Y) and Wartime Cruising with ZEBRA (WC-Z). This allows us to explore the 
separate effects watch and material conditions. Specific damage conditions considered are “intact 
ship,” “partially blocked passages” and “fully blocked passages.” An intact ship exhibits no 
substantial damage and has all passageways clear: a fire in the engine room of a ship might 
require the ship’s evacuation yet no passageways (or nearly none) need by blocked or made 
impassable by a fire. For “partially blocked passages,” speed is reduced on certain arcs to 
represent passageways filled with smoke or partially filled with water, or to represent passages 
being used by damage-control parties. “Fully blocked passages” represents a situation in which 
certain passageways are destroyed by fire or explosion, for instance, after the impact of a missile. 
Arcs representing such passageways are explicitly removed from the DERS network. We assume 
damage conditions for the Álvaro de Bazán similar to those experienced by the USS Stark in 1987 
(Levinson and Randy [17], pp. 16-18) and the USS Cole in 2000 (Raman [22]).  
A last test case explores a plausible design change which could improve evacuation times for 
a given level of ship integrity.  
In all scenarios, lifeboat availability determines the maximum physical capacities at the 
mustering stations. Unless otherwise specified, these capacities are as follows: 147 crewmembers 
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at the forecastle station, 147 at the flight-deck station, and 36 at the boat-deck station. (Note that 
the total capacity of 330 lifeboat seats exceeds the ships standard complement of 245 
crewmembers by 35%.) 
4.3 Evaluating Static Routes 
We evaluate static routes by solving DER-NL with g i jf  fixed to 0 for any arc ( , )i j  if 
technical drawings for the frigate contraindicate evacuation in that arc’s direction. In no scenario 
does damage block a passage required by a static escape route. That is, we have not modeled a 
scenario in which some crewmembers follow the static route defined by technical drawings, find 
a passage blocked, are forced to find some other escape route, and thereby incur a substantial 
delay in their evacuation. Analysis of such situations might show even greater benefits for DERS 
than those reported below.  
4.4 Initial Testing 
Before investigating how DERS can improve ship evacuations over a static escape route 
system, we want to show how DERS’ solutions produce sensible tradeoffs between average 
evacuation time and ship integrity, depending on how the parameter α is set.  To do this, we 
analyze four intact-ship scenarios that cover GQ-Z, WC-Y, GQ-Y and WC-Z, across a wide 
range of values for α .  (Recall that GQ-Y and WC-Y are artificial conditions, used only for this 
analysis.) 
Figure 3 shows the “approximate efficient frontier” for the ship-integrity and evacuation time 
indices that is generated for each scenario by solving DERS for various values of α between 
0.001 and 0.999; “approximate” applies here because DERS is solved with a heuristic. We make 
the following observations on this figure. 
• The curves have the right shape, that is, they are generally convex and decreasing.  (The 
curves would be perfectly convex if we were solving a linear program rather than a 
nonlinear MIP.) 
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• The WC-Z curve lies to the left of the WC-Y curve and, likewise for GQ-Z versus GQ-
Y. This means that the 12 “Z”-labeled closures, which are open in material condition 
YOKE but closed under ZEBRA, do not shorten average evacuation times appreciably 
by being open.  (Furthermore, if for some α those 12 closures formed a subset of the 
optimal set of opened closures, we would see a Z- and corresponding Y-curve cross.  
This would happen because the condition YOKE would not incur the “fixed charge” for 
opening those closures.) 
• The conclusion above is strengthened by observing this fact:  the fastest evacuation times 
for material  condition YOKE lead to noticeably worse integrity indices compared to the 
fastest times for ZEBRA.  (For 0.999α = , compare GQ-Y to GQ-Z, and compare WC-Y 
to WC-Z.) 
• The substantial differences between the GQ-Y and WQ-Y curves, and between the GQ-Z 
and WQ-Z curves, indicate that the crew’s physical distribution about the ship does 
influence evacuations substantially.  (In fact, the crew occupies more compartments 
under General Quarters than under Wartime Cruising.) 
• If ship integrity is of little concern ( 0.999α = ), the ship can be evacuated in roughly the 
same amount of time, independent of the watch and material conditions considered here. 
For simplicity in the remainder of our computational tests, we consider only GQ-Z, WC-Y 
and IP-X scenarios, and keep α  fixed to 0.75. This allows us to focus on how ship damage 
affects results, and lets us demonstrate how DERS could be used to help improve a ship’s design. 
4.5 Results for Intact-Ship Scenarios 
Table 2 displays overall results for the GQ-Z, WC-Y and IP-X scenarios. Dynamic routes 
improve the objective-function value by between 16% and 24%, as a result of improvements in 
both average evacuation time and ship integrity. Average evacuation time reduces by up to 23% 
with DERS, while the integrity index reduces by up to 45%; the individual watertight and airtight 
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integrity indices reduce by up to 50% and 11%, respectively. In the GQ-Z scenario the airtight 
index actually degrades by 11%, but this is offset by a 50% improvement in the watertight index 
and a 13% reduction in evacuation time, for an overall objective-function improvement of 22%, 
and an overall integrity index improvement of 37%. 
Dynamic routes achieve improvements over static routes by changing the direction of select 
escape-route signs, using fewer so that routes are more direct, and opening fewer closures.  For 
instance, in the GQ-Z scenario, 
• DERS reverses sign directions in 13 passageways, which results in 8 passageways being 
used in opposite directions between the two routing solutions (the static solution does not 
use 5 of these 13); 
• DERS uses 222 total arcs versus 247 for the static solution;  
• The two solutions have only 148 "traversed passageways" in common; 
• DERS opens 86 total closures versus 105 for the static solution; and 
• The two solutions have only 62 opened closures in common. 
So, it appears that the relatively modest number of direction-reversals on escape-route signs leads 
to a dramatically different escape-route solution.  
The total number of evacuees that reach each mustering station are similar in the IP-X 
scenario, for both static and dynamic routes. However, in the GQ-Z and WC-Y scenarios, 
dynamic routes increase the use of the flight-deck mustering station by 25% and 6%, respectively. 
Dynamic routes also use escape trunks for more crewmembers than do static routes. This seems 
to be a desirable result, as escape trunks offer a fast and protected egress from spaces located in 
lower decks, without significant watertight degradation. 
4.6 Results for Damaged-ship Scenarios 
 “Damaged-ship scenarios” are characterized by a damaged area and the extent to which 
passageways and closures in that area are disabled. We are interested, in part, in discouraging 
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flows of evacuees through the passageways used by repair parties, as well as counter-flows 
between these groups. To do this, we simply decrease ( )i jS F  along arcs ( , )i j  used by repair 
parties.  (So, we do not prohibit counter-flows between repair parties and evacuees.)  We analyze 
two examples of damage to the case-study frigate. The damage scenarios are based on two attacks 
on the U.S. frigates, USS Stark and USS Cole. Table 3 displays results. 
Case 1: USS Stark     
In this scenario, the Álvaro de Bazán receives an impact similar to that received by the USS 
Stark in 1987. The following conditions hold. 
• Watch condition: General Quarters or Wartime Cruising. (The USS Stark was at sea at the 
time of the attack.)   
• Material condition: ZEBRA with General Quarters and YOKE with Wartime Cruising. 
• Damage condition: Passageways and closures located on Decks 1, 2 and 01, on the bow port 
side, become impassable. Additionally, speed is significantly reduced for any crewmembers 
traversing passageways that would be used by repair crews. 
Compared to static escape routes, dynamic routes improve the ship-integrity index by 36% 
for both scenarios, and reduce the average evacuation time by 8% and 22%, respectively. DERS 
does not directly minimize the time that the last evacuee reaches a mustering station, but we note 
that, in the Wartime-Cruising scenario, this statistic is 32% smaller for the DERS solution 
compared to its static-route counterpart; it is 10% larger in the General-Quarters scenario, 
however.  
 
Case 2: USS Cole 
 
In this scenario, the Álvaro de Bazán is moored, port side to pier, and an explosion occurs 
amidships, close to the waterline.  This affects the engine room and other areas. This scenario 
represents a situation similar to that experienced by the USS Cole in 2000, although the Cole was 
anchored in a port at the time of the attack, not moored at a pier. Two important facts characterize 
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this case: most of the crew is resting on the lower decks, and only one ladder, on the flight deck, 
leads to the pier. The only watch condition considered is In-port; the material condition is XRAY. 
(Because of potential threats, the USS Cole was actually in a modified ZEBRA condition when it 
was attacked in the Yemeni port of Aden. We assume that the Álvaro de Bazán is moored in a 
port that has been deemed safe.)  
Under these assumptions, we expect the majority of the crew to evacuate the ship via the 
flight-deck ladder. To model this situation, we modify the capacity of the forecastle mustering 
station to 10% of the total crew (instead of the 60% assumed in other scenarios), and increase the 
capacity of the flight deck to 100%. This forces most of the crew to head toward the flight deck 
from their berthing areas situated on Decks 2 and 3. We assume that lifeboats cannot be lowered, 
and therefore set the capacity of the boat deck to zero. Repair parties will try to control flooding 
by pumping water through the escape trunk on the port side of the damaged engine room.  
DERS improves the objective-function value by 20% over the static plan, reduces the average 
evacuation time by 26 seconds (25%) and keeps more watertight doors closed.  (The last evacuee 
escapes faster, too.) Dynamic routes take advantage of known usable passageways to avoid 
congestion, despite the need to route most of the crew to the flight-deck mustering station.  
4.7 Design-Change Scenarios 
Naval architects must demonstrate the effectiveness of a ship’s evacuation system during the 
early steps of the design process, when important changes have less impact on the production 
budget. DER-NL could be used to evaluate various design alternatives with respect to this 
effectiveness. To demonstrate this, we consider a design modification to the Álvaro de Bazán that 
increases the widths of all passageways and closures by 10%, which would enable faster 
movement by the crew in the case of an evacuation. This modification is always possible, in 
theory, although it would require that the ship’s dimensions be increased or that compartment 
sizes be reduced.  
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We explore the new design for an intact ship, and compare results to those presented earlier 
for DERS, obtained without the design modifications (Table 2). Table 4 presents the comparison. 
In all cases, the optimal objective-function value improves, especially in the Wartime-Cruising 
scenario (by 26%) and the In-port scenario (by 39%).  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have demonstrated the improvements that a dynamic escape route system (DERS) on a 
naval ship can have over the current paradigm of static routes. DERS plans escape routes that 
minimize a weighted sum of an evacuation-time index and a ship-integrity index. The first index 
represents a normalized function of average evacuation time, and the second reflects the number 
of closures (doors, hatches, etc.) that are opened to facilitate evacuation.   
For the Spanish frigate Álvaro de Bazán, average evacuation time across three baseline 
intact-ship scenarios is reduced by up to 23%, while the ship’s integrity is improved by up to 
50%. In some damaged-ship scenarios, these savings are even greater. 
We model the evacuation process in DERS using a nonlinear, integer-programming model, 
“DER-NL.” We solve this model heuristically with provably good results: for standard test cases 
that balance evacuation speed and ship integrity fairly evenly, the heuristic yields solutions that 
lie within 3% of a specially computed lower bound. (When the objective function heavily favors 
ship integrity, however, this “provable optimality gap” increases substantially, at least in part 
because the lower bound weakens.) 
DERS improves upon a static system because it can account for (a) the physical distribution 
of the crew (this varies depending on the ship’s watch condition, but is typically well defined), (b) 
obstructed passageways or closures, and (c) the known status of each closure, open or closed. We 
also demonstrate how DER-NL could help evaluate how design changes to a ship would affect 
the crew’s evacuation speed and the ship’s post-evacuation integrity. 
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Additional study is certainly warranted.  In particular, simulation experiments should be 
carried out to verify the accuracy of the approximations used in DER-NL and to make possible 
adjustments.  It seems unlikely, at least for the frigate used in our computational example, that 
constraining one objective and optimizing the other would yield substantially different results.  
However, this goal-programming technique might be useful when analyzing other ship types, and 
that option should be kept in mind. 
Simulation might show that DERS does not improve the evacuation process as much as 
predicted, at least in some scenarios. But, greater benefits than seen in this paper might accrue in 
others. For instance, we have not compared DERS to static routes in scenarios in which some 
static routes are blocked. In such a situation, static routes could result in much backtracking, 
confusion, congestion and delay, while DERS could lead crewmembers to a direct, quick and safe 
egress. Finally, we also note that DER-NL could be used during the ship’s design process to 
determine a distribution of life boats at the ship’s mustering stations that best accommodates a 
range of scenarios. 
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 Table 1.  Crew distribution for the Álvaro de Bazán, by deck, for the watch conditions of General 
Quarters, Wartime Cruising and In-port. Values in the table are numbers of crewmembers. 
 Deck 
  4 3 2 (Main) 1 01 02 03 
General Quarters 20     5 101 34 59 20 6 
Wartime Cruising  9   59 110 23 32   9 3 
In-port  0 167   62 14   0   2 0 
 
 
Table 2. Computational results for intact-ship scenarios. Note that ˆ ˆˆ (1 )z T Iα α= − − , where zˆ denotes the 
best value objective value calculated through DER-NL. Tˆ  is the average evacuation time divided by the 
reference time t ;  Iˆ  is the ship-integrity index, calculated as a weighed average of the watertight and 
airtight integrity indices (weights β and 1−β, respectively). Test cases use 0.75α = , 0.75β =  and  180t =  
seconds, unless otherwise specified. 








Model Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Objective value zˆ  0.40 0.31 0.41 0.31 0.49 0.41 
Evacuation-time  index Tˆ  0.36 0.31 0.39 0.33 0.40 0.31 
Ship-integrity index Iˆ  0.52 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.73 0.72 
Avg. evac. time (sec.) 64 56 70 59 73 56 
Watertight index 0.56 0.28 0.51 0.25 0.65 0.63 
Airtight index 0.40 0.45 0.34 0.30 0.97 0.97 
Last group’s time (sec.) 143 106 131 106 70 80 
 
 
Table 3. Computational comparisons for the damaged-ship scenarios on the “USS Stark case.” 
Ship USS Stark USS Cole 








Model Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Objective value zˆ  0.40 0.33 0.49 0.36 0.60 0.48 
Evacuation-time index Tˆ  0.36 0.33 0.49 0.38 0.55 0.41 
Ship-integrity index Iˆ  0.52 0.33 0.49 0.31 0.74 0.72 
Avg. evac. time (sec.) 64 59 88 68 99 73 
Watertight index 0.56 0.29 0.54 0.29 0.66 0.63 
Airtight index 0.40 0.44 0.36 0.40 0.97 0.97 
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Table 4. Objective function, evacuation time and ship integrity for the new design for intact-ship scenarios: 
Comparison in “% of improvement” with respect to DERS’ results without the design change.  The 
material condition is XRAY in all cases. 
Watch condition General Quarters 
Wartime 
Cruising In-port 
Objective value zˆ  4.8% 26.1% 38.7% 
Avg. evac. time (sec.) 1.7% 27.1% 32.1% 
Last group’s time (sec.) 12.3% 1.9% 1.3% 
Watertight index 9.2% 25.8% 77.3% 









Figure 1. Representative movement-speed function ( )ijS F , where F  denotes the concurrent flow of 
crewmembers on arc ( , )i j . A minimum speed ε > 0 is used to avoid divisions by 0.  










Figure 2. Sample DERS network components for the Álvaro de Bazán created from technical drawings.  
The Álvaro de Bazán has a length, beam and draft of 147, 18 and 10 meters, respectively, and a 
displacement of 5,800 tonnes. 
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Figure 3.  Approximate efficient frontiers for the evacuation-time index versus the ship-integrity index as 
computed by DERS for an intact ship under different watch and material conditions.  The plots cover 
values of α ∈ (0.001, 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.40, 0.60, 0.80, 0.90, 0.95, 0.97, 0.99, 0.999)—these 
values are listed next to the points they correspond to—for each of four combinations of watch condition 
and material condition.  The first two combinations, General Quarters with Zebra (GQ-Z) and Wartime 
Cruising with Yoke (WC-Y) are standard.  The second two, General Quarters with Yoke (GQ-Y) and 
Wartime Cruising with Zebra (WC-Z), are artificial combinations that are used to help interpret results.  
 
